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KEY SUPREME COURT RULING ON PLANT PATENTS
— by Roger A. McEowen* and Neil E. Harl**
A late 2001 U.S. Supreme Court ruling1 that newly developed plant breeds are
patentable under the general utility patent laws of the United States has important
implications for farmers, plant breeders and consumers.
Facts of the Case
Pioneer held seventeen general utility patents2 covering the manufacture, use, sale,
and offer for sale of its inbred and hybrid corn seed products, and sold the protected
seeds under a limited label license that allowed only the production of grain and/or
forage, and prohibited the use of the seed for propagation or seed multiplication or
the development of a hybrid or different seed variety.  J.E.M Ag Supply (J.E.M.)
bought patented seeds in bags bearing the license agreement.  When J.E.M resold
the bags, Pioneer sued for patent infringement.  J.E.M. moved for summary
judgment on the basis that Pioneer’s patents were invalid because plants are not
patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101, and that the Plant
Patent Act (PPA)3 and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA)4 set forth the only
statutory protection for intellectual property rights in plants.  J.E.M.’s motion was
denied and the trial court ruled for Pioneer,5 the F deral Circuit affirmed,6 an  the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.7
Scope of 35 U.S.C. §101 – the Patentability of Plants
35 U.S.C.§101 provides:
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.”
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,8 the Supreme Court concluded that the Congress
drafted 35 U.S.C. §101 broadly with the intent that the patent laws be given wide
scope,9 and held that a manmade micro-organism fell within the statute’s scope.
The Court noted that the Congress made a statutory distinction between products of
nature and manmade inventions, rather than between living and inanimate things.
The Court’s language in Diamond v. Chakrabarty10 was generally believed to be
sufficiently broad to suggest that even plants that could be protected under the PPA
or the PVPA could be the object of a general utility patent.  Indeed, this position
was confirmed in a 1985 case involving genetically engineered corn,11 and since
that time the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has issued nearly 2,000 utility
patents
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for plants, plant parts, and seeds under 35 U.S.C. §101.
Consequently, the Pioneer Court had no trouble holding that
newly developed plant breeds fall within the scope of 35
U.S.C. §101.
Exclusivity of PPA and PVPA
The crux of J.E.M.’s position was that the Congress, in
enacting the PPA and the PVPA, provided the exclusive
statutory means for protecting plant life because both Acts
are more specific than 35 U.S.C. §101 and thereby carve out
plants from utility patent law for special treatment.12
However, the Court noted that the PPA did not contain any
statutory language indicating that the Congress intended the
PPA to serve as sole means of protection for asexually
reproduced plants.  J.E.M. also maintained that the Congress
intended the PPA as the sole means of protection for
intellectual property rights in plants because existing general
utility patent laws (as of 1930) did not allow for patents on
plants, and that there would have been no reason to enact the
PPA had general utility patent law allowed plant patents.
The Court disagreed, reasoning instead that J.E.M.’s
argument failed to account for the state of patent law and
plant breeding as of 1930, which involved a general
presumption that plants were products of nature and were
not amenable to the written description requirement of utility
patent law.  Thus, when the PPA was enacted, the Congress
believed that plants were not patentable under utility patent
law because they were viewed as living things not amenable
to a written description, and not because they could not have
been patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101.13
The Court also rejected J.E.M.’s argument that the PVPA
was the exclusive mechanism for protecting intellectual
property rights in plants.  The Court noted that the language
of the PVPA did not restrict the scope of patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. §101, and did not contain any
statement of exclusivity.14  The Court took particular note
that, at the time of the PVPA’s enactment in 1970, the PTO
had already issued numerous utility patents for hybrid plant
processes, and had assigned utility patents for plants since
1985 with no indication from the Congress that such action
was inconsistent with the PVPA or the PPA.
Implications of the Court’s Opinion
In recent years, seed companies have been taking legal
action against farmers for saving seed protected by a utility
patent.  Much of that litigation was on hold pending the
Supreme Court’s opinion.  It is now expected that the
litigation will resume and intensify.  An important point is
that conventional seed as well as genetically modified seed
may be patented.  Farmers using such seed do not have the
right to save any of the seed for replanting.
The opinion is also anticipated to further accelerate the
amount of germplasm that is held privately rather than in the
public domain as seed companies devote additional
resources to patent any seed that is economically worth
planting, whether genetically modified or conventional.
That could have serious ramifications for the breeding
programs of public plant breeders.  Relatedly, the opinion
clears the way for inbred and hybrid seed products
developed by public research institutions to be patented
consistent with the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.15  This could
result in public research being directed to a greater extent
towards satisfying the desires of the firms that purchase the
rights to the patents or otherwise exert pressure on public
research, and to a lesser extent towards the desires of
farmers and consumers.
The opinion could also lead to increased concentration,
now approaching monopoly in some areas, of germplasm in
private hands,16 reduced competition and innovation in plant
breeding (including that from public breeding), increased
concentration due to small seed companies being unable to
find new breeding material, and greater control by the firm
holding the patent over the crops grown from patented seed.
Consumers may ultimately be negatively impacted by such
events.
Clearly, the Congress bears the burden to modify the
exis ing statutory language of 35 U.S.C.§101, the PPA or the
PVPA if it is desired that plants not be patentable, or the
proj cted impacts of the Court’s opinion be avoided.
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developments.  See also, In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952
(C.C.P.A. 1979) (section 101 drafted broadly and in
general terms). Also, the Committee reports
accompanying the 1952 revisions to the PPA indicate that
the Congress intended statutory subject matter to “include
anything under the sun that is made by man.”  S. Rep.
No. 82-1979 at 5 (1952).  Likewise, in State Street Bank
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093
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10 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
11 Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Interferences 1985) (maize plants within the
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matter” and therefore were within the subject matter of
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from their crops for replanting.  Utility patents issued for
plants do not contain such exemptions.
13 The Court noted that denying patent protection under 35
U.S.C. § 101 simply because such coverage was thought
technologically infeasible in 1930 would be inconsistent
with the forward-looking perspective of the utility patent
statute.  See, e.g., In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.
1979) (section 101 drafted broadly and in general terms).
Also, the trial court in Pioneer noted that the intent of the
Congress in adopting the PPA and the PVPA was to
extend patent protection to an area not often able to meet
the requirements of 35 U.S.C. §112 (written description
requirement), given the limits of plant science at the time
each act became law.  49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813 (N.D.
Iowa 1998).
14 See also S. Rep. No. 91-1246 at 3 (the PVPA “does not
alter protection currently available within the patent
system.”
15 35 U.S.C. §§200 et. seq. (effective July 1, 1981, the Act
allows public research institutions to patent research
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l ndmark change in United States technology policy).
16 Presently, the top 10 seed companies control
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
ANIMAL ABUSE. The defendant was convicted of one
misdemeanor count of animal abuse under Mo. Rev. Stat. §
578.012, arising out of the escape of 30 cattle after a tree
blew down in a storm onto the defendant’s fence. The
defendant challenged the conviction on the grounds that the
state failed to show that the defendant knowingly failed to
provide adequate control of the cattle. The court pointed to
extensive testimony from area farmers that cattle fences had
to be inspected almost daily and that the defendant’s cattle
had escaped on several occasions. In addition, the court
noted that the defendant’s own testimony demonstrated that
the defendant’s fence was particularly susceptible to damage
from erosion and falling trees. The defendant also testified
that the defendant did not frequently check the fences. The
court held that the evidence demonstrated that the defendant
was so careless in maintaining the fences that the defendant
knew the cattle were going to escape; therefore, the state had
proven the defendant knowingly failed to provide adequate
control of the cattle. The decision is a bit troubling because
the conviction arose from only one incident, the escape of
the cattle after a storm blew a tree down on the fence. There
was no discussion of how much time elapsed after the storm
and before the cattle escaped, which would have indicated
that the defendant’s infrequent fence inspection led to the
cattle escape. Without this information, it appears that the
defendant was convicted for the previous escapes as a
pattern of behavior, since the event which gave rise to the
conviction was beyond the control of the defendant. Justice
may have been done, but bad law may have resulted. State
v. Blom, 45 S.W.3d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE . The debtor borrowed money from a bank
and told the bank that the money was to be used for
purchasing horses. The debtor granted the bank a purchase
money security interest in all horses located at the debtor’s
farm. The money was deposited in the debtor’s checking
account but was never used to purchase horses. Instead, the
debtor testified that the money was used for unforeseen
expenditures, including paying off a loan on the debtor’s
truck so the vehicle could be traded-in for a new truck,
paying off large telephone bills, the purchase of new
furniture for the debtor’s home, the purchase of a new
heating unit and roof for the house, and for mental health
care for the debtor’s son. The loan was in default when the
debtor filed for bankruptcy and the bank sought to have the
debt declared nondischargeable, under Section 523(a)(2)(A),
for false representation in obtaining the loan. The bank
claimed that the debtor had no intention of purchasing horses
with the loan proceeds. The court found that several of the
expenditures were not unforeseen: (1) the telephone charges
existed before the loan was made, (2) the payment of the
truck loan was not necessary for the trade-in, and (3) the
purchase of the new furniture was not necessary. The court
held that the debtor did not intend to use the loan proceeds to
purchase horses and used false representation to obtain the
loan; therefore, the loan amount was not dischargeable. In re
McCoy, 269 B.R. 193 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS . Two days before the
debtor’s marriage, the debtor transferred 712 acres of
farmland to the debtor’s son for $10, but did not record the
deed. The deed was recorded during divorce proceedings in
which the former spouse was awarded a lien on the debtor’s
interest in the farmland. The former spouse sued to set aside
the transfer to the son but the state court ruled that the
